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5 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kent Crane of the Murphy Commission Staff

25X1A 1. On 4 March I met with Kent Crane to discuss factual and interpretation errors in the draft Murphy Commission reports on intelligence. Although [redacted] had forwarded to Crane written comments on this subject, he had not received them as of 4 March. Therefore, I 25X1A reviewed with him [redacted] previous conversations with Fisher Howe regarding an opportunity to have a formal review of the final draft report and our general concerns about the inadequacy of the report as now written.

2. This brought forth a rather violent outburst against Howe, including the fact that a promise to review the report could not be trusted, that Howe is anti-intelligence community, and that Howe prefers to disregard DoD intelligence as not being germane to foreign policy development and support. Thus, our general comment that many parts of the report seemed unrelated to foreign policy support caused Crane to observe that this "plays right into Fisher Howe's hand". As to our comment about alternatives not being considered or discussed, Crane said this was deliberate to preclude the Commission supporting a wrong alternative. He said the Commission is not interested in putting out a strong intelligence report, but his (Crane's) interest is to assure that what is issued is factually correct and not destructive. He alluded to the determination of Senator Mansfield to have an open intelligence budget, and to the risk that a weak report will lead "the Aspins, Harringtons, et al," to probe more deeply into the intelligence community and tactical intelligence in order to verify the expenditure 25X1A of [redacted]

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
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3. Crane sees four primary thrusts for the intelligence report, and his avowed efforts are to keep it on this track supported as well as possible. The "thrusts" are:

- a. Greater responsibility for and greater interest in intelligence by senior policymakers.
- b. Greater authority for the DCI in community matters.
- c. Greater centralization of intelligence activities in the DoD.
- d. Greater oversight of the intelligence community.

4. Having established these points, Crane then proceeded to go through the comments paper. We briefly discussed Service Cryptologic Agency relationships with NSA and the service-peculiar functions for which they are responsible. This conversation generally followed the lines of my earlier talk with [redacted]. Errors in the NRO relationship were noted. We discussed the large manpower figures associated with Service intelligence, and I told him that I had been unable to verify them. I asked him for the source of the figures, and he said they were from Marchetti's book. I said that was an unreliable source. We started discussing "tactical" or military force support intelligence, organic units, SIGINT direct support, NSA direct service, etc., when he admitted that he would have to come back later for a longer discussion.

5. He left to carry out the balance of his arranged schedule, and he will be back later this week or next.



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